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Abstract
A central thesis of Steven French’s brand of ontic structural realism
has always been his eliminativism about objects. Unsurprisingly, this
bold and controversial thesis has seen a lot of critical discussion. In his
book The Structure of the World—Metaphysics & Representation, French
accordingly defends this thesis against a range of challenges. A novel
feature of this defense is the use of dependence relations to articulate his
eliminativism. In this paper I take a critical look at French’s defense of
eliminativism and argue that the dependence relations invoked do not
eliminate objects.
Keywords: eliminativism; ontic structural realism; ontological dependence;
ordinary objects; explanation;
1 Introduction
In The Structure of the World—Metaphysics & Representation [French, 2014]
Steven French provides a comprehensive articulation and defense of Ontic Struc-
tural Realism (OSR). Throughout the book French engages with a wide range
of interlocutors, which makes the book the most thorough contribution to the
field to date. In his book, French defends ontic structural realism as a successful
response to three challenges every scientific realist has to face: the pessimistic
meta-induction, underdetermination, and Chakravartty’s challenge. The latter
is the demand that a realist needs to explain what it is she is a realist about.
Chakravartty’s challenge invites an account of the metaphysical commitments
of various forms of scientific realism. A tension French points out and wrestles
with throughout the book arises from this challenge on the one hand, and the
threat of underdetermination on the other hand. While Chakravartty demands
that the realist must provide a metaphysical account, underdetermination wor-
ries suggest that physical theories leave metaphysical questions less than fully
resolved. French’s proposal in response to this tension is that structural realism
provides a better response than its competitors. The task for the structural re-
alist is to show why structure is something we can glean from scientific theories
in the face of underdetermination, and to specify what structure is, if that is
what we are to be realists about.
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Ontic structural realists hold that “structure is all there is”. To specify
what is meant by this slogan, and to defend it, ontic structural realists need
to articulate both what they mean by “structure”, and what they take to be
excluded from the ontology. These two issues are addressed in the first half of the
book. With respect to the first, French’s answer is “group-theoretic structure”,
and he proceeds to defend this answer against a number of competitors and
objections (chapters five and six). With respect to the second question, what
is not part of the ontology, French holds a distinctly more radical view than
other ontic structural realists.1 For French, structural realism contrasts with
“property-oriented realism”, but more importantly, it contrasts with “object-
oriented realism”. And while other ontic structural realists are willing to allow
that a “thin” notion of object has a role to play in a structuralist ontology,
French aims to eliminate objects from the ontology altogether (chapter seven).
Realism about group-theoretic structure, together with eliminativism about
objects, then, are the two theses articulating what French’s ontic structural
realism is. In the second half of the book French shows what ontic structural
realism thus conceived can do. In particular he develops accounts of causation,
laws, and symmetries from an ontic structural realist perspective, as well as
extending the view beyond physics to philosophical problems in biology. With
these latter discussions French takes structural realism significantly beyond its
original home in the philosophy of physics.
Here I will be concerned only with the project of articulating ontic structural
realism. More specifically I will focus on eliminativism about objects. Under-
standing eliminativism is important because it is, prima facie, a radical thesis
and hence often met with skepticism or puzzlement. What does eliminativism
about objects mean? There are actually two readings of this claim to be found
in the book (see for example [French, 2014, 177]): a more radical one, and a
somewhat more moderate one. On the radical reading, the claim is simply that
there are no objects anywhere at all. Objects do not exist. On the less radical
reading objects “reappear” in the structuralist ontology, but they are “recon-
ceptualized” in terms of structure, where that “reconceptualization” is taken to
be so complete as to leave no traces of genuine objecthood. I will come back to
this ambiguity below. I will organize my discussion around three challenges to
eliminativism about objects:
1. objects are required to articulate structural realism
2. objects seem obviously a part of the world around us
3. quantum particles might be objects
I will argue that French’s responses to these challenges are not fully con-
clusive, and I will suggest some responses and modifications on the structural
realists’ behalf. I ultimately suggest that eliminativism about objects is less
central to the structural realists’ project that French makes it out to be.
1For more moderate approaches see Ladyman and Ross [2007] and Esfeld and Lam [2008].
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2 Objects are required to articulate structural
realism
The first of these challenges is a version of the oldest objection to OSR on the
books: how can there be structure without objects? Isn’t that conceptually
incoherent? Since the emergence of OSR, this objection has been raised in a
number of different forms.2 The fundamental concern is that we understand
what structures are by thinking about relations among objects. In his book,
French addresses this worry in its most recent form: if the structure an ontic
structural realist is a realist about is group theoretic structure,3 then how does
an eliminativist get around the fact that we need objects in order to introduce
group theoretic concepts in the first place?
French responds to this concern by introducing what he calls the Poincare´
Manoeuvre:
Although we might introduce the terminology, or perhaps better,
symbology, of objects as part of our representation of the relevant
structure, these should be regarded as mere devices that allow us to
construct, articulate, or appropriately represent the relevant struc-
ture, and any representational priority they might have should not
be taken to imply that they are ontologically foundational [French,
2014, 67].
The idea behind the Poincare´ Manoeuvre is to treat objects relied upon in
the construction of group theoretical relations as mere heuristic devices, or as
Poincare´ [1898] puts it, “a crutch”, which can be dispensed with once the con-
struction is completed. French employs the Poincare´ Manoeuvre throughout
the book to ward off the objection that structural realism cannot even be ar-
ticulated without reference to objects, that objects are integral to any attempt
of constructing or representing the relevant structure. Using the Poincare´ Ma-
noeuvre French accepts the need for objects in the construction of his preferred
representational structure, while disowning any commitment to objects appar-
ently represented by such structures. The idea seems to be something like this:
when we first introduce the notion of a set or a group, we do so by imagining
certain relations and operations performed on objects. We might characterise a
group, for example, by describing possible rotations of the square. This yields
the cyclic group on four elements. Nonetheless we should not take squares and
their rotations as somehow essential to this group—they were just a means of
getting us there.
Declaring something a ‘mere’ heuristic device is a familiar way to rid oneself
of metaphysical commitments of all sorts, and any such declaration will raise
2For a range of different ways of expressing this concern, see Chakravartty [2004], Busch
[2003], and Psillos [2001], among others.
3French actually thinks that we need to distinguish between structures relevant for physics,
which for him are group-theoretic structures, and structures that we might employ as philoso-
phers of science to describe scientific theories, which might include set-theory as well as other
representational tools [French, 2014, 139].
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some amount of suspicion. Two questions should be asked: first, in what sense
are objects heuristic devices in the relevant constructions, and second, is that
the only role objects play with respect to the structures in question?
The reason set-theory and group-theory look like they might be representa-
tions of objects is that they present certain relations among elements. These
elements, in simple intuitive cases, will be objects, including arithmetical ob-
jects like numbers. Since the same group-structure might apply to different
kinds of objects, no particular collection of objects is needed to introduce group-
structure. For example, we could have arrived at the cyclic group on four el-
ements using the integers modulo 4 under addition instead of the rotations of
the square. The objects used in the construction of a group are arbitrary, which
suggests that properties beyond those represented by the group structure are
irrelevant.
Is that enough to get rid of objects? I don’t think so. True, at least some
of the features of objects used in the construction and representation of group
theoretic structure are not relevant to the construction of the group, and can
hence be set-aside. But so far this seems to be the mathematician’s familiar
insistence that the particular illustration chosen must be disregarded to appre-
ciate the abstract character of the mathematical conception. Poincare´’s own
description brings this out quite clearly: “For me, on the other hand, form ex-
ists before the matter. The different ways in which a cube can be superposed
upon itself, and the different ways in which the roots of a certain equation may
be interchanged, constitute two isomorphic groups. They differ in matter only.
The mathematician should regard this difference as superficial, and he should
no more distinguish between these two groups than he should between a cube
of glass and a cube of metal” [Poincare´, 1898, 40].
The contrast Poincare´ draws seems to be analogous to the contrast between
sensible matter and mathematical description. Just as we abstract away from
the particular material constitution of an object to give its geometrical descrip-
tion, e.g. saying that it is a cube, we similarly abstract away from the particular
relations among numbers, or spatial rotations and translations of particular ge-
ometrical figures, in order to arrive at the structure of the group. Poincare´’s
contrast in both cases is that between form and matter, and he insists that for
the mathematician form, in particular the group, is prior to any matter. Note
also that, contrary to Poincare´’s own presentation, this priority concerns the
identity of the group, not its existence. Poincare´ argues that isomorphism is
sufficient for group identity, regardless of the ‘matter’ which realizes the group.
Groups do not depend, for their identity, on a particular mathematical or phys-
ical realization. Similarly one might say that two structures are the same if
they are isomorphic to one another, even if they are instantiated by different
collections of objects. But it does not immediately follow that the structure
does not depend for its existence on some objects or other to instantiate it. So
even if form, in Poincare´’s sense, is prior to matter, it is unclear that this means
also that form does not depend on objects for its existence.
Another reason to think that groups require objects, at least for the case of
finite groups, is that one important feature of a (finite) group is its order, which
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depends on the cardinality of its elements: the cyclic group on four elements
has different properties from the cyclic group on five elements. So while it may
be arbitrary for any abstract group, which realization of the group we use to
illustrate it, group structure nonetheless imposes some constraints on which
collections of elements might be able to realize it. In particular, finite groups
require that collections of objects have a determinate cardinality.
Another respect in which Poincare´’s original manoeuvre seems to differ from
French’s employment of it, is that form and matter distinctions can be reiterated.
The relation between form and matter seems to be that of the more general or
abstract to the more specific or concrete. By contrast, the difference between
structure and objects, especially on the eliminativist understanding, seems to
be one of two competing metaphysical categories. French also suggests a kind of
iterative approach to structure at times, but it seems to be somewhat different
in character.
[...] I shall respond to it by appealing to a kind of iterative move:
the distinction ESR is based on is really one between structures and
putative ‘objects’, such as electrons, protons, and so forth. In those
terms, one can still make the desired structuralist claim about where
the relevant continuity [across theory change] lies. However, and this
is the next step in the iteration, the metaphysical consequences of,
for example, Permutation Invariance, mentioned earlier, lead us to
conclude that the putative objects should either be regarded as what
we shall call [...] ‘thin’ objects, at best, or should not be regarded
as objects at all. Thus in the first stage of the iteration we begin
with a putative distinction, one side of which we then discard in the
second, leaving only the structure (or, at best, as we’ll see, structure
with ‘thin’ objects) [French, 2014, 19].
The iterative move suggested by French might prima facie seem similar to
the idea proposed by Poincare´. First you start from some physical posits, like
electrons, protons and so forth, and draw a distinction between objects and their
structure. The epistemic structural realist then goes on to declare that we can
only know about their structure, whereas the ontic structural realists insist that
a closer look reveals that the putative objects were never (real, substantial) ob-
jects to begin with. Whether this second move works will depend on the status
of quantum particles (see below). Crucially, though, it seems that the iteration
here is quite different from the one suggested by Poincare´. For Poincare´, the
objects initially used to introduce group structure simply become irrelevant for
the further purposes of the mathematics of groups. By contrast, ontic struc-
tural realists want to say that the objects used to discover the relevant physical
structures turn out not to be objects.
Finally, even if we grant Poincare´ that taking form as prior to matter is the
right perspective for the mathematician to take, is it the right move to make for
a structural realist? Not entirely, it seems to me. For ontic structural realism,
as French understands it, is ultimately a view about physical structure, not
mathematical structure. So it seems we need to know not only which group
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structure is appropriate for a given physical theory, we also need to accept that
the world contains elements that stand in relations that can be described by
that group structure.
I would like to raise two questions for French regarding the Poincare´ Ma-
noeuvre. Firstly, is the intended difference between structure and objects really
captured by the contrast between form and matter? And secondly, is it really
the case that the ontic structural realist can take the mathematician’s abstract
view of group structure? In particular, how does this move fit with the claim
later on, that the structures in question are interpreted structures? If structures
are interpreted, it would seem that what Poincare´ calls the matter of a group
matters, not just its form
3 The world contains physical objects
Let me now turn to the remaining two challenges for the eliminativist about ob-
jects, namely the idea that objects are all around us, and the idea that quantum
particles might be objects. Steven French addresses both concerns explicitly in
the book, and he offers a mix of old and new arguments to defend eliminativism
in light of these objections.
The old argument is the well-worn underdetermination argument: quantum
statistics, claims French, leaves it underdetermined whether quantum particles
are individuals or non-individuals. The best response to this underdetermina-
tion, French suggests, is to move away from an object-based ontology, thereby
avoiding the question of individuality or non-individuality of objects altogether.
To do so reduces the overall humility we have to accept in our metaphysical
picture of the world. The underdetermination argument has been widely dis-
cussed in the literature (see especially Brading and Skiles [2012] for a critical
discussion), so I will set it aside for the remainder of this paper.
Instead I would like to focus on a new line of argument developed in the
book, which is the attempt to articulate eliminativism through the employment
of a dependence relation. French develops this account separately for ordinary
objects and quantum particles.
The general strategy is to show that putative objects depend on structure in
such a way as to eliminate the objects altogether. Dependence relations are typ-
ically thought to be metaphysical priority relations, where the priority might be
existential, essential, or explanatory [Correia, 2008]. If a existentially depends
on b, then necessarily, if a exists, b exists. If a essentially depends on b, then
necessarily, for a to be that very entity, b must exist. If a explanatorily depends
on b, then necessarily a exists in virtue of/because of b. It helps to illustrate
these relations using the frequently employed example of Socrates and singleton
{Socrates}.4 Necessarily, if Socrates exists, then {Socrates} exists, and vice
versa. So singleton {Socrates} depends existentially on Socrates, and Socrates
depends existentially on singleton {Socrates}. If the last dependence relation
seems counterintuitive, other dependence relations might come into play. For
4The example was famously used by Fine [1994] to argue against modal reductionism.
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example, one might try to articulate the dependence of singleton {Socrates}
on Socrates using essential dependence: singleton {Socrates} depends, for its
identity, on Socrates, but not vice versa.
French uses a combination of essential and explanatory dependence relations
to articulate his eliminativism about ordinary objects and quantum particles as
objects. This is an odd strategy, since dependence relations are not usually
thought to eliminate one of the relata. To say that b is prior to a is not usually
the same as saying that a does not exist, or that a can be eliminated from the
ontology at no cost. What a dependence of a on b might show is that b is more
fundamental than a. Combined with the view that only what is fundamental
(really!) exists, this might yield the view that a does not exist fundamentally.
French seems to want to go further, though: “[L]abelling where a and b sit in
some metaphysical hierarchy does not obviate the original concern. So, in the
case of explanatory dependence, if all the facts about a hold in virtue of and
explained by facts about b, then we can certainly mount a case that a is at best
derivative upon b, or may even be eliminable in favour of b” [French, 2014, 166].
French seems to insist, then, that some dependence relations might very well
eliminate dependent entities, if, so to speak, not much is left of the explanandum
after the explanation has been given. Objects are not merely ontologically less
fundamental than structure, they are to be eliminated in favour of structure.
But eliminativism does not follow from dependence. While it seems plausible
to suggest that if B is (metaphysically) explained by A, then B is derivative (at
least relative to A), further argument seems to be requirement to move to the
claim that B does not exist.
Here is perhaps a way forward, at least if we understand the relevant de-
pendence to be a kind of explanatory dependence. We might try to distinguish
between vindicatory explanations, and undermining explanations.5 Vindicatory
explanations explain that things appear a certain way in terms of the fact that
things in fact are as they appear. A meta-ethical realist, for example, might ex-
plain the fact that ethical judgments appear (to their proponents) to be univer-
sally valid and objectively true, by suggesting that they are in fact objectively
true. There is not much to be said beyond this to explain their appearance.
Contrast this with a non-vindicatory or undermining explanation,6 where the
goal is to explain away the appearance of certain facts. The meta-ethical error
theorist, for example, might explain away the appearance of our ethical judg-
ments as universal and objectively true, by explaining these features in terms
of certain aspects of our psychology: we feel threatened by behavior which does
not conform to norms we have internalized, and social coordination depends on
a shared understanding of what’s right and wrong. This explanation is meant
to be undermining, because the facts in virtue of which our ethical judgments
appear to be universal and objectively true, undermine the claim that these
judgments are in fact objectively true. Their appearance turns out to be mis-
leading. For an eliminativist about objects the question then becomes, whether
5I’m loosely borrowing this notion of vindicatory explanation from Wiggins [1991].
6I will be using ‘non-vindicatory’ in the sense of ‘undermining’.
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the dependence of objects on structures can be understood in an undermining
way. To do so we have to distinguish the two cases French considers: ordinary
objects on the one hand, and quantum particles on the other.
3.1 Ordinary objects
As an eliminativist about objects, French claims that objects do not exist. In
the case of ordinary objects, this claim might seem to be in good company with
a number of non-structuralist metaphysical views. As French himself points out
(see French [2014, 170]), there are many positions in mainstream metaphysics
which similarly treat ordinary objects as non-fundamental. Some of them, like
certain types of nihilism, might also agree that their non-fundamental status
means that ordinary objects do not exist [Merricks, 2003]. Very much like other
eliminativists, French later introduces a number of metaphysical manoeuvres to
reconcile our talk about ordinary objects with the assertion that, fundamentally,
there are no objects. If so, is French’s eliminativism really as radical?
For ordinary objects, French illustrates his position using Eddington’s fa-
mous two tables: the commonplace table, which is extended, colored, and sub-
stantial, in contrast to the scientific table, which is mostly empty and not sub-
stantial. The eliminativist, it seems, wants to claim that the commonplace table,
as a substantial object, does not really exist. It does not really exist, because
its features are thoroughly explained by the underlying physics, in particular for
us today, quantum field theory. The solidity of the table, says French, “holds in
virtue of the relevant physics as expressed in the Exclusion Principle and, more
fundamentally, the anti-symmetrization of the relevant aggregate wave-function.
In this case one might then insist that the latter feature of quantum mechanics
entirely explicates the solidity of every day objects and in doing so eliminates
the predicate from the scope of our fundamental ontology” [French, 2014, 170].
There are a few comments I would like to make about this account of how
quantum mechanics eliminates objects. First, the crucial feature of objects,
both in Eddington’s example and French’s use of it, seems to be solidity. But
while solidity is certainly a salient feature of many everyday objects, it is not
clear that it metaphysically essential for objects to be solid. For example, most
of us would be happy to call a hot air balloon an ordinary object, even though
we know it’s mostly just hot air, and definitely not solid. So focussing on solidity
might be a bit misleading. Solidity does seem to be a crucial feature of what
we call ‘bodies’, and it seems to me that this turns out to be quite crucial in
the discussion that follows.
Second, and more importantly, for French, the crucial issue seems to be
whether the explanation is complete, that quantum mechanics “entirely expli-
cates the solidity of everyday objects”. But as I suggested earlier, the complete-
ness of the explanation does not seem to be the crucial point, although it is a
necessary condition. Even a complete explanation can be vindicatory, and so
a friend of everyday objects might take the fact that quantum mechanics gives
a complete explanation to provide a reason for being justified in solidity talk,
and by extension, object talk. What French needs to show is not only that the
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explanation is complete, but also that it undermines, rather than vindicates,
object talk.
Why should the quantum-mechanical explanation be non-vindicatory? Un-
like the explanation given by the meta-ethical error theorist, nothing in the
quantum mechanical explanation obviously undermines the claim that objects
are solid in the way in which describing ethical judgments as the result of par-
ticular psychological and social conditions undermines their claim to universal
truth. But even scientific explanations are sometimes undermining. A classic
example is the heliocentric explanation of the observed motion of the sun. For
an observer on the surface of the earth it looks as though the sun moves around
the earth, but that appearance is brought about by the rotation of the earth
instead. The quantum mechanical explanation of the solidity of objects would
have to be of a similar sort in order to count as non-vindicatory.
If we take solidity to be a characteristic feature of objects, that is, if we think
that what is at issue is that ordinary objects are bodies, I think a case can be
made for this. What makes the explanation undermining is that it explains
the solidity of objects in terms of something that is not solid, and, French will
argue, should not be thought of as objects either. On behalf of the eliminativist,
let’s put this as follows: The fact that there are solid objects (bodies) holds in
virtue of facts about non-solid non-objects. In particular we might say that solid
objects exist in virtue of the anti-symmetrization of fermionic wave-functions.7
Can we understand these ‘in virtue of’ explanations as non-vindicatory? We
have to ask what exactly is undermined by these explanations. Not, I take it,
the appearance that there are solid objects. That there appear to be objects,
and that they appear to be solid, is the explanandum. What is undermined,
instead, is the straightforward explanation of this appearance, namely that there
appear to be objects simply because there are objects. More importantly, the
quantum-mechanical explanation also undermines a sophisticated version of the
straightforward explanation: there appear to be solid objects because the world
ultimately consists of very small solid objects, which combine together to form
larger solid objects. The quantum-mechanical explanation, because it is in
conflict with at least some of the key features we attribute to ordinary objects,
rules out corpuscularianism. What is undermined, in the first instance, then, is
a particular physical hypothesis: it’s bodies all the way down.
If this is indeed the argumentative role of the dependence relation, then the
resulting “eliminativism” is not the thesis that ordinary objects do not exist,
nor is it the claim that ordinary objects are structurally re-conceptualized. For
the quantum mechanical (or quantum field theoretical) account of the features
of ordinary objects is not a conceptual or even a metaphysical explanation, it
is a (kind of) causal explanation. Objects as we know them exist; they are
particular macro-level effects of certain quantum level interactions, operating
under certain constraints (like the Exclusion Principle). Presenting elimina-
tivism about ordinary objects as a first-order metaphysical thesis seems to be a
bit misleading.
7Dependence relations of this sort are invoked on pp. 170 and 176 [French, 2014].
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The quantum mechanical explanation does create a problem for “object-
oriented metaphysics”, the idea that our metaphysical categories and theories
should be based around the notion of solid, individual objects. What is un-
dermined is the idea that something like objects will be the fundamental con-
stituents of the world around us, and that the features we regard as essential to
objects will be preserved by whatever we find at that fundamental level. Ob-
ject oriented metaphysics, on this gloss, turns out to be the view that while
macroscopic objects may not be fundamental, they are nonetheless metaphys-
ically interesting because they are ultimately made up of objects, just smaller
ones. What the non-vindicatory explanatory dependence of ordinary objects on
quantum mechanics shows is not so much that there are no objects, or even that
we are wrong about their features, but instead that theories shaped by our ideas
about objects are not suitable as a framework for fundamental metaphysics. It
does not work, because quantum physics suggests that what explains the ex-
istence and features of ordinary objects is in turn very much unlike ordinary
objects. That’s taking a stance against object oriented metaphysics, but with-
out elimination of objects. Instead it is something closer to a meta-metaphysical
thesis, a thesis about how do to metaphysics. The suggestion is that we should
base our metaphysical theories on our best physical theories, and that the latter
suggest an ontology quite different from that suggested by ordinary objects.8
There are two questions I would like to raise at this point: First, if the
explanatory dependence is indeed causal, then it seems metaphysical depen-
dence is too strong a relation. Do we really want to say that solid objects are
necessarily such that they exist in virtue of the existence of appropriate wave-
functions? That is, do we want to rule out corpuscular or Newtonian universes
as metaphysically (or even physically) impossible? Second, how does the would
be eliminativist respond to the emergentist about objects, who might agree with
most of the argument offered, but insist that this shows that objects are emer-
gent entities, not present at the physically most fundamental level, but part of
our universe nonetheless?
3.2 Quantum-particles as non-objects
Let’s turn to the final concern about objects, the question whether quantum
particles are objects. Talk of quantum particles might seem to pose a challenge
for eliminativism. If they are objects, then it would seem that even if ordinary
objects are not fundamental, we re-encounter objects at the fundamental level.
French again appeals to a notion of dependence, although at first glance it
seems to be slightly different notion from the one employed earlier in the argu-
ment against ordinary objects. He suggests that in quantum physics “The very
constitution (or ‘essence’) of the putative objects is dependent on the relations
of the structure” [French, 2014, 181]. He explicates this notion of essential de-
pendence further: “x dependsE for its existence upon y =df. It is part of the
essence of x that x exists only if y exists” [French, 2014, 182].
8This meta-metaphysical stance seems to be fairly close to the stance proposed in [Ladyman
and Ross, 2007].
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The new idea here seems to be that putative quantum objects are essen-
tially such that in order to exist, necessarily a (certain kind of) structure has to
exist. Once again it is not clear that, even if such a relationship indeed holds,
this would suffice to eliminate objects. Suppose essentialism about origins is
right, in which case me being who I am depends upon my parents existing and
standing in a particular relationship to me. Even if essentialism about origins
were true, it would not follow that I do not exist, nor that there is not more
to me than the fact that I am my parents’ child. The necessitation involved in
dependence relations is quite unproblematic for the dependent entity, provided
that the dependee exists. Accordingly I don’t quite see how French’s next claim
is supposed to follow from or be illuminated by this notion of essential depen-
dence. “Our putative objects only exist if the relevant structure exists and the
dependence is such that there is nothing to them—intrinsic properties, iden-
tity, constitution, whatever—that is not cashed out, metaphysically speaking,
in terms of this structure. This yields eliminativist OSR: there are no objects,
thick or thin, and no identity, contextual or otherwise”[French, 2014, 182].
Essential dependence alone does not yield this result, so perhaps the de-
pendence invoked here is once again a species of explanatory dependence. In
that case, it seems French is here facing the same difficulties as earlier. What
he needs is a non-vindicatory explanation of why particles sometimes appear
object-like. As stated, however, the explanation seems vindicatory. The puta-
tive objects only exist if the structure exists. Well, since the ontic structural
realist presumably thinks that the structure does exist, he should hence have no
problem allowing the objects to exist as well. Indeed, it seems that those who
insist on ‘thin’ objects, or objects with contextual identities, are embracing this
vindicatory result.9 The reason we are permitted to think that there are ‘thin’
objects is precisely that everything about them can be cashed out in terms of
structure. If particles in quantum mechanics only have an identity if certain
structures exist, that is, if they have their identity in virtue of standing in cer-
tain relations, then we should be perfectly happy to attribute existence and
identity to them if those relations or structures are in fact in place. It seems,
then, that considerations from quantum mechanics do not give us good reasons
to favour eliminativism over re-conceptualized quantum mechanical objects.
French could try to block this vindicatory interpretation, by insisting that
quantum theory shows that particles are not objects. The type of dependence
argument French really needs for his eliminativism is the following: objects
depend (existentially or essentially) on something B, and quantum mechanics
gives us reason to believe that B does not exist. If quantum mechanics gives us
reason to believe that particles exist, then they cannot be objects. To give such
an argument, French would need to present a suitable B. B would have to be an
entity, feature, or relation plausibly required for objects to exist (or for objects
to have an identity), yet it would also have be something definitively ruled out
by quantum mechanics. A possible candidate for the relevant B might be haec-
9For an detailed discussion of contextual identities from a structuralist point of view, see
[Ladyman, 2007].
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ceities. So if quantum mechanics showed that quantum particles definitely do
not have haecceity, one might then conclude that quantum particles are not ob-
jects. But French’s own underdetermination arguments suggest that quantum
mechanics leaves it open whether quantum particles are individuals possessing
haecceities. Haecceities are of course only one candidate, and if quantum me-
chanics does not even decisively rule out particular candidates for B, then it
seems unlikely that quantum mechanics could entail that no possible candidate
could exist.
Even if one does not accept the underdetermination argument, one might
worry, as Brading and Skiles [2012] do, that it is too much to require an ‘identity
profile’ of objects for them to count as objects. More generally, an eliminativist
has to show both that objects must have a certain kind of feature to count
as objects, and that quantum mechanics rules out quantum particles having
this feature. Quantum particles lack many features we commonly attribute to
ordinary objects, like solidity. On the other hand, we do at times attribute
very object-like features, like cardinality, to collections of quantum particles.
The difficult question, it seems to me, is whether we can make sense of these
attributions outside the ordinary context in which we normally use them.
4 Conclusion
Let me conclude with a brief summary. I’ve focused on one aspect of French’s
articulation of OSR, his eliminativism about objects. I considered three sources
of problems for this view: objects might be needed for the articulation of struc-
tural realism, objects are all around us, and quantum particles might be objects.
I suggested in response to the first, that French’s Poincare´ Manoeuvre needs a
little more footwork, and in response to the latter two that dependence relations
do not get rid of objects. In particular I suggested that dependence relations
are in fact too strong for the intended conclusion, that the explanatory depen-
dence relations seem vindicatory rather than undermining, and that existential
or essential dependence relations only eliminate dependent entities if no suitable
dependee can be found.
Instead I’ve suggested that we should take ontic structural realism to be
committed to the (widely shared) first-order metaphysical thesis that ordinary
objects are not fundamental. This widely held view, together with the view
that the entities of fundamental physics are not (ordinary) objects and the
commitment to a physics-based metaphysics yields the meta-metaphysical thesis
that our metaphysics should not be ‘object-oriented’, that is, we should resist the
temptation to attribute features of objects to the elements of our fundamental
ontology. We can reject object oriented metaphysics even without eliminativism
about objects, provided the only objects we recognize are non-fundamental. So,
why be an eliminativist?
12
References
Katherine Brading and Alexander Skiles. Underdetermination as a path to ontic
structural realism. In Elaine Landry and Dean Rickles, editors, Structural
Realism: Structure, Object and Causality. Springer, 2012.
J. Busch. What structures could not be. International Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, 17:211–225, 2003.
Anjan Chakravartty. Structuralism as a form of scientific realism. International
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 18:151–171, 2004.
Fabrice Correia. Ontological dependence. Philosophy Compass, 3:1013–1032,
2008.
Michael Esfeld and Vincent Lam. Moderate structural realism about space-time.
Synthese, 2008.
Kit Fine. Essence and modality. Philosophical Perspectives, 8:1–16, 1994.
Steven French. The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014.
James Ladyman. On the identity and diversity of objects in a structure. Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume LXXXI:23–43,
2007.
James Ladyman and Don Ross. Every thing must go. Oxford University Press,
2007.
Trenton Merricks. Objects and Persons. Clarendon Press, 2003.
Henri Poincare´. On the foundations of geometry. The Monist, 9(1):1–43, 1898.
Stathis Psillos. Is structural realism possible? Philosophy of Science, 68(13-24),
2001.
David Wiggins. Moral cognitivism, moral relativism and motivating moral be-
liefs. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 91:61–85, 1991.
13
